Quoting Bloggingheads:
Recorded: December 29 Posted: March 24

we at least talking december 2009?

This diavlog was beset by numerous technical difficulties. I'm told that it was delayed in an attempt to fix one of them.

Well it's good to see another Apollo DV, even if it was even more absurdly delayed than my DV with PMP.

Quoting Don Zeko: Well it's good to see another Apollo DV, even if it was even more absurdly delayed than my DV with PMP.

And no warzone-technology-impairment excuse.

The classic example of the advertisement collective actual problem which I forgot to mention was the tobacco industry. When tobacco advertisements in the US were banned their revenues universally increased. Joseph Heath's The Efficient Society has a good discussion of it.

This was the first apollo diavlog I enjoyed as much as the better regular diavlogs. (insightful, fluent and cogent conversation) I haven't seen status goods, collective action and taxation put together in this way. @hamandcheese:
Are there any estimates about the volume of non utility status spending? My moderate libertarian argument for specific taxes is that you need to tax some things anyway. Given constant spending, you can easily employ Bastiat's classically liberal concern about the seen and the unseen. The unseen being the tax that would have to be levied instead in this case. Most libertarians are truly arguing like anarcho-capitalists. They always list all of the problems with a specific tax or tariff to protray themselves as being more free market and non interventionist and to feel good about themselves.

In terms of consumers and purchases, the more rational the less margin and profit. Meaning fewer jobs, meaning even less capacity to purchase.
Anyone who buys a mac has paid more than would they could have paid for a comparable specced pc in most cases. But is that a bad thing for society? Would it be better than people only ever bought pcs with the most razor thin margins, only what they needed and nothing more?
That may be more rational, not sure that would be better.
So long as basic needs are a good chunk less than peoples total income, failing to create value in things other than basic needs would seem to retard the flow of capitol from people to the economy instead of hoarding it in their accounts. On who cares about environmentalism, irrelevant. Who can afford to DO the most about environmental issues is the wealthy.
In another example, it may be true that people who donate money to aid programs may care more about the problems of people who are less fortunate, but the people promoting trade and industry in those countries actual

Quoting hamandcheese: The classic example of the advertisement collective actual problem which I forgot to mention was the tobacco industry. When tobacco advertisements in the US were banned their revenues universally increased. Joseph Heath's The Efficient Society has a good discussion of it.

And how does he propose minimizing that effect? There will not be a ban on generic advertising on non controversial and negative health products, put a tax on advertising?

Quoting JonIrenicus: There will not be a ban on generic advertising on non controversial and negative health products, put a tax on advertising?

Exactly. Unfortunately I don't have the book in front of me, but he proposes an adjustment to the way ad. expenses are tax deductible. There is nothing inefficient with advertisement generally, it's just a matter of returns for the scale. A small tax on advertisement costs wholesale, however, would become a big tax on humongous advertisement budgets, especially if the tax was progressive.

Quoting JonIrenicus: failing to create value in things other than basic needs would seem to retard the flow of capitol from people to the economy instead of hoarding it in their accounts.

This is a good point. Given the fact that virtually everything denotes some social status, I'm definitely not arguing that "status taxes" are at all practical, and they would muddle with the flow of money pretty significantly, outside of a handful of obvious cases. The example of a country club is pretty clear cut, though, such that if you ask why the owners why their fees are high they'll more or less say "to keep the peasants out" (or something

http://www.engadget.com/2010/03/24/g...ity-hip-again/

Quoting hamandcheese: The example of a country club is pretty clear cut, though, such that if you ask why the owners why their fees are high they'll more or less say "to keep the peasants out" (or something like that). By imposing a tax the country club gets what it wants (an upper-crust membership). The fees are not to finance anything; only to create a barrier to entry, so why would they miss them?

Wouldn't this fail to account for competition between country clubs? After all, I don't think that cc's have particularly absurd profit margins, so they're clearly spending the money on something that increases the club's attractiveness to wealthy potential members.

Quoting Don Zeko:

Quoting hamandcheese: The example of a country club is pretty clear cut, though, such that if you ask why the owners why their fees are high they'll more or less say "to keep the peasants out" (or something like that). By imposing a tax the country club gets what it wants (an upper-crust membership). The fees are not to finance anything; only to create a barrier to entry, so why would they miss them?

Wouldn't this fail to account for competition between country clubs? After all, I don't think that cc's have particularly absurd profit margins, so they're clearly spending the money on something that increases the club's attractiveness to wealthy potential members.

I didn't press Sam on the country club example in the diavlog, because it was useful shorthand for veblen goods, which do indisputably exist. A true veblen good isn't subject to the normal pressure you describe because, at the margin, it has a positively-sloped demand curve, meaning an increase in price, unrelated to any underlying change, causes an increase in demand. But as to the specific example, I agree with you. None of the country clubs I have ever been were even remotely veblin goods (though I suppose

Quoting dieter: Most libertarians are truly arguing like anarcho-capitalists. They always list all of the problems with a specific tax or tariff to protray themselves as being more free market and non interventionist and to feel good about themselves.

To be clear, my objection to the form of taxation Sam is proposing isn't especially an market-oriented objection. To the extent that there is really an economic rent present as Sam describes it, and such a phenomenon is reliably identifiable, this sort of tax is, from an economic perspective, the best kind. My objections come more along the line of wariness about 1) the cultural judgments that appear to motivate a condemnation of certain spending as 'luxury' and 'irrational' and 2) the ability to be certain that the tax won't actually distort things. Obviously you have to pay for government somehow, but simple taxes spread across a large base (i.e. general income and sales taxes) are thought to be more desirable because they are more reliable, more stable across time, less prone to corruption and rent-seeking, have more uniform effects on the market, and they require less information to administer.

Those are some very insightful responses, Jim, and I'll have to take some time to consider them, but in the context of the original premise of our discussion, the merits of a generic libertarian view of coercion, I regret bringing up these specific hypothetical examples instead of sticking to the issue of coercion. I think I've found a way to express my argument in 3 sentences: 1: Just like State-endorsed slavery + sweatshop wage-labour are extreme examples of coercion, one legal, one economic, an 8% sales tax + Walmart undercutting your mom-and-pop store are obviously not as insidious or violent. 2: Libertarians (the more extreme the better) evaluate coercion based on the source of coercion, as oppose to the strength or effects of the coercion. 3: Rather, I say we should group types of coercion and draw moral equivalence in the way I've done with underlines above, if we are truly serious about liberty.

Another thought on these two, Jim seems to be playing the role of the Comedian to Hams Ozymandias.
(Need to have watched the Watchmen movie for that to have the slightest chance to make sense)
It was MUCH more extreme in the movie, but The comedian was skeptical and doubtful about the capacity of Ozzy to manage the ups and downs of conflict from on high.
Ozzy in the end had a more "State" coercion style approach. And in the movie, it looked like it was going to work, for all the downsides, save that wrinkle at the end. The Comedian won in the movie, but maybe Ozymandias is better for real life in some areas. Please someone tell me some of this makes sense (lie if you have to)

Isn't the classic coercion argument like this. Libertarian: Coercion is wrong as a matter of natural law. Socialist: It is perfectly natural for a group of people to gang up on an individual. Real laws are created by people to prevent such things. Libertarian: OK fine, even if you don't agree with my natural law arguments let me put it in terms you understand [bunch of consequentialist arguments]. Socialist: But your arguments give too much weight to future generations. What about people today? Libertarian: With your logic we'd still be living in grass huts. Socialist: (wistfully dreaming of grass huts) Sorry what did you say? Libertarian: This is the problem with you socialists. Always with the dreaming. Try the real world. Socialist: NO U!!! Libertarian: No Yer Mama!!! Socialist: Don't talk about my Mama. *takes a swing* Libertarian: *ducks* Now we see the violence inherent in your coercive system. **violence ensues**

If you accept that free markets occasionally produce bad outcomes--like peacock tails--the question becomes whether intervention can produce better outcomes. This generally devolves into arguments about what is a better outcome. In all the arguments I have about this sort of thing, the philosophical bedrock of libertarians is that freedom is a value in and of itself. Consequentialist arguments are always tactical. I know there are a number of libertarians who don't appear to think this way (Will Wilkinson or Brink Lindsey among the BHTV crowd) but I tend not to meet such people in the wild (surely a failure on my part).

Quoting themightypuck: If you accept that free markets occasionally produce bad outcomes--like peacock tails--the question becomes whether intervention can produce better outcomes. This generally devolves into arguments about what is a better outcome. In all the arguments I have about this sort of thing, the philosophical bedrock of libertarians is that freedom is a value in and of itself. Consequentialist arguments are always tactical. I know there are a number of libertarians who don't appear to think this way (Will Wilkinson or Brink Lindsey among the BHTV crowd) but I tend not to meet such people in the wild (surely a failure on my part).

Two responses: 1) I think that if you accept that free markets sometimes produce bad outcomes — which I do accept —*there are two questions that result: the question whether an intervention will produce a better outcome, and the meta-question how certain you can be of your answer to that first question. 2) The position that freedom has value in and of itself is not at all incompatible with consequentialism. Far from it, the degree to which a system produces meaningful freedom can be (ought to be) one of the

Good point with 1 although I think it folds into the value discussion. All action is under some level of uncertainty and that always has to be part of the calculus. On the other hand, there is no natural order of things to fall back on. I agree with 2. The question is whether a libertarian cares at a philosophical level whether freedom leads to better outcomes when you take freedom itself out of the outcome calculus. This is what I meant when I said things devolve into arguments about how to value outcomes. I probably shouldn't have said "devolve" as it implies that there is something wrong with these arguments. As for all consequentialist arguments being tactical, I overstepped. It has been my personal experience that many libertarians use consequentialist arguments even though, by definition, there exist no consequentialist arguments that could defeat them. Neither you nor hamandcheese did anything like this and I didn't mean to imply it. Mea culpa.

In response to Jim, I whole heartily accept the knowledge problems in all forms of government policy. Like I say in the video, an argument for libertarianism will have to be made on a practical level. My main arguments were a rebuttal to ethical rejections of state solutions on the basis that they're operationally non-voluntary, or the irrelevant moral distinction between the centralized and decentralized. In some cases I do think are there places that the knowledge required to act with precision is quite ascertainable by bureaucrats. States are big fans of insurance schemes precisely because they yield a high level accuracy with a minimum level of reflex. The strength of the Libertarian we're talking about really determines my examples. I know many anarcho-capitalists who would be opposed to even the state creation and auctioning of property titles, preferring all property arrangements to be spontaneous. In other words, depending who I'm talking to the definition of "intervention" ranges dramatically. I would, however, propose an action principle to philosophical scepticism. You may be familiar with the stories about the ancient Greek sceptic Pyrrho. He was so sceptical that, reportedly, if he saw a man drowning in

Quoting hamandcheese: In response to Jim, I whole heartily accept the knowledge problems in all forms of government policy. Like I say in the video, an argument for libertarianism will have to be made on a practical level. My main arguments were a rebuttal to ethical rejections of state solutions on the basis that they're operationally non-voluntary, or the irrelevant moral distinction between the centralized and decentralized.

In some cases I do think are there places that the knowledge required to act with precision is quite ascertainable by bureaucrats. States are big fans of insurance schemes precisely because they yield a high level accuracy with a minimum level of reflex.

The strength of the Libertarian we're talking about really determines my examples. I know many anarcho-capitalists who would be opposed to even the state creation and auctioning of property titles, preferring all property arrangements to be spontaneous. In other words, depending who I'm talking to the definition of "intervention" ranges dramatically.

I would, however, propose an action principle to philosophical scepticism. You may be familiar with the stories about the ancient Greek sceptic Pyrrho. He was so sceptical that, reportedly, if he saw a man drowning in

I found it annoying that hamandcheese would switch topics when he was losing an argument. I found it to be "logically rude". I wish Jim would have insisted cheese stay on topic and make his point inside an area of shared knowledge.

Flaw: Are you particularly referring to this part? Because that clip bothered me too. The excerpt I linked to is Jim summarizing my view after several minutes of trying to clarify it, and even though I seemingly ignore him, what he says is exactly what I was arguing, and my reply would have been better-off if it had started with "Precisely, Jim" and then my elaboration. There is also a moment when Jim corrects me by pointing out that all intervention into a market is distorting. He's right. What I meant to say was coercive, and that makes sense in context. The purpose of the golf club case, and the whole reason to bring it up (and I did find golf clubs, for example, that require you purchase a 13million dollar house off the fairway just for membership) is to rebut the libertarian line that tax is always violent and coercive theft. The ritzy golf club, however, is premised on there being a meaningless and unnecessary premium. By replacing that premium with a tax no one is being coerced, because the members want to pay it and the owners want it applied. Like I wrote above, I regret that discussion switched

I just started watching this (and about 6 minutes in), but wouldn't it make the conversation more productive to have at least one libertarian in the debate? At about 6 minutes in it looks like there are 2 people debating about libertarianism, but neither seems to actually understand what libertarianism actually is. I.e., they seem to be creating straw man arguments.

@hamandcheese: When libertarians are talking about coercion they are talking about physical coercion. I.e., punching someone in the face, or stabbing someone, etc. They are not talking about a person going and getting a job because that person wants a certain life style. If you conflate the two, then you will not "get" libertarianism.

Quoting wreaver: I just started watching this (and about 6 minutes in), but wouldn't it make the conversation more productive to have at least one libertarian in the debate?

At about 6 minutes in it looks like there are 2 people debating about libertarianism, but neither seems to actually understand what libertarianism actually is.

I.e., they seem to be creating straw man arguments.

I think Jim might have something to say about whether he himself to be a libertarian. If you think you see a fallacy, wouldn't it be helpful to indicate what you believe to be fallacious?

Quoting AemJeff: I think Jim might have something to say about whether he himself to be a libertarian.

You can't truly be a libertarian until at least one other person claiming to be a libertarian purports to evict you from the movement. I believe it's in the by-laws somewhere.

Quoting jimM47: You can't truly be a libertarian until at least one other person claiming to be a libertarian purports to evict you from the movement. I believe it's in the by-laws somewhere.

Libertarians have by-laws? That sounds dangerously close to letting Leviathan into the Libertarian organization. You, sir, are no Libertarian.

Quoting wreaver: When libertarians are talking about coercion they are talking about physical coercion. I.e., punching someone in the face, or stabbing someone, etc.

That distinction — between coercion that is or is not backed by the threat of physical force — is actually more difficult to flesh out than it appears to be at first blush, and it makes the pursuit more pragmatic than some care to admit. First, most coercion is physical coercion only in an attenuated sense. If I get a speeding ticket, the physical coercion forcing me to pay it exists only at the end of a long causal chain. I have to refuse to contest the ticket, refuse to pay it, refuse to pay it again, get arrested, and resist arrest or incarceration before I am gonna get anyone punching me in the face. When we count that as being physical coercion we need to remember to follow the same chain for everything. When we do, we run into two problematic cases: economic coercion and social coercion. At base a lot of economic coercion can be reduced to saying, 'you can't come on my land, use my things, or eat my food unless you have

Quoting Don Zeko: Libertarians have by-laws? That sounds dangerously close to letting Leviathan into the Libertarian organization. You, sir, are no Libertarian.

Thanks, Zeke, but it doesn't count when you expel me. It has to be someone who knows the secret handshake.

Quoting jimM47: Thanks, Zeke, but it doesn't count when you expel me. It has to be someone who knows the secret handshake.

Which one?

Quoting jimM47: You can't truly be a libertarian until at least one other person claiming to be a libertarian purports to evict you from the movement. I believe it's in the by-laws somewhere.

My apologies. I just didn't get the impression that you were a libertarian (at 6 minutes into the video).

I fully endorse and agree with Jim's post, the one that begins with "That distinction". If you ignore the causal chain then the state is only ever coercive on the margins -- on those civil disobedients and criminals who defy the law. The other 99 out of a 100 people pay their taxes and smoke their weed in private, only occasionally feeling as if they're being "forced" to do anything, it's in our human nature to simply go with the flow. My arguments were addressed specifically to the crowd who think the only legitimate way to organize society is in a way altogether voluntary -- not those libertarians who simply say "well, a smaller government just works better." And I did so by trying to point out that their constant focus on government interventions ignores the huge anti-libertarian forces of, say, cultural homophobia. Ireland has blasphemy laws, for example, that any good libertarian should be opposed to. But if one removes those laws to reveal beneath a society that ostracizes and boycotts anyone who heresies than by what measure has one increased the liberty in a society? Perhaps culture is more malleable, as

Quoting hamandcheese: If you ignore the causal chain then the state is only ever coercive on the margins -- on those civil disobedients and criminals who defy the law. The other 99 out of a 100 people pay their taxes and smoke their weed in private, only occasionally feeling as if they're being "forced" to do anything, it's in our human nature to simply go with the flow.

I agree with your overall point wholeheartedly, but I'd be a bit more careful with language here. In an ideal state, as designed by you, myself, or most other Liberals, this is true, but most states as they actually exist do exert coercive power on more than just the margins, not to mention unfree states that coerce on far more than the margins of society.

Quoting Don Zeko: I agree with your overall point wholeheartedly, but I'd be a bit more careful with language here. In an ideal state, as designed by you, myself, or most other Liberals, this is true, but most states as they actually exist do exert coercive power on more than just the margins, not to mention unfree states that coerce on far more than the margins of society.

Actually I would argue that even comparatively repressive regimes are only coercive by a casual chain. That is, their populations self-regulate and self-censor because of fear with very little direct coercion exerted on them. In this sense even state coercion is, for the majority, a type of social or cultural coercion. Bare in mind that I'm not using this to justify state coercion, but to scold the libertarians who fall for the idea that only direct coercion counts. Pulling in the chain is a must.

Quoting hamandcheese: Actually I would argue that even comparatively repressive regimes are only coercive by a casual chain. That is, their populations self-regulate and self-censor because of fear with very little direct coercion exerted on them.

In this sense even state coercion is, for the majority, a type of social or cultural coercion. Bare in mind that I'm not using this to justify state coercion, but to scold the libertarians who fall for the idea that only direct coercion counts. Pulling in the chain is a must.

But where do you stop? Suppose you're willing to pay no more than a dollar on an apple and yet it costs 1.05, so you forgo the apple. Is that coercion? I mean, we do live in a society, my action influences everyone else's actions, even if marginally so.

Quoting Unit: But where do you stop? Suppose you're willing to pay no more than a dollar on an apple and yet it costs 1.05, so you forgo the apple. Is that coercion? I mean, we do live in a society, my action influences everyone else's actions, even if marginally so.

If you want to say the 5 cent difference is on a spectrum of coercion, I'm fine with that, I just don't think its warranted much moral concern, in the same way I wouldn't consider a 5% sales tax to be very morally egregious either, especially if its used to provide useful services. This is the point I'm making. So yes, you could consider it coercion (it's ultimately up to which semantics you choose) but I don't consider it to be immorally so. Why? Because the consequences are not having an apple, as opposed to death or alienation. And the cost of avoiding the consequences are, as you point out, extremely low. The gist of it is to question the notion that there is the state, and then there is freedom; and to posit that non-governmental forces, including peers, can be just as detrimental to our liberty as g-men. The exact formulation of how and

Quoting hamandcheese: If you want to say the 5 cent difference is on a spectrum of coercion, I'm fine with that, I just don't think its warranted much moral concern, in the same way I wouldn't consider a 5% sales tax to be very morally egregious either, especially if its used to provide useful services. This is the point I'm making.

So yes, you could consider it coercion (it's ultimately up to which semantics you choose) but I don't consider it to be immorally so. Why? Because the consequences are not having an apple, as opposed to death or alienation. And the cost of avoiding the consequences are, as you point out, extremely low.

The gist of it is to question the notion that there is the state, and then there is freedom; and to posit that non-governmental forces, including peers, can be just as detrimental to our liberty as g-men. The exact formulation of how and why this is so is of secondary importance to me.

That was well said h&c.

Quoting hamandcheese: If you want to say the 5 cent difference is on a spectrum of coercion, I'm fine with that, I just don't think its warranted much moral concern, in the same way I wouldn't consider a 5% sales tax to be very morally egregious either, especially if its used to provide useful services. This is the point I'm making.

So yes, you could consider it coercion (it's ultimately up to which semantics you choose) but I don't consider it to be immorally so. Why? Because the consequences are not having an apple, as opposed to death or alienation. And the cost of avoiding the consequences are, as you point out, extremely low.

The gist of it is to question the notion that there is the state, and then there is freedom; and to posit that non-governmental forces, including peers, can be just as detrimental to our liberty as g-men. The exact formulation of how and why this is so is of secondary importance to me.

There is a difference though between private plunder and govt plunder, which I think makes govt plunder "morally" worse. If tomorrow I'm mugged at the street corner I can try to fight back, and my act of

Quoting Unit: There is a difference though between private plunder and govt plunder, which I think makes govt plunder "morally" worse. If tomorrow I'm mugged at the street corner I can try to fight back, and my act of self-defense will be recognized as legitimate by the larger society. But no one can fight back govt plunder. ...

Your mugger analogy is seriously flawed. Trying defending yourself against mobsters and oligopolies, or price gauging of inelastic services, or "pre-existing conditions", or debt collectors and drug lords. Its not quite as easy.

You might point to voting, but that's such a weak remedy from an individual point of view that it becomes almost irrelevant.

The history of the unionist movements around the world are, in the eyes of the members, attempts to resist the muggers. And they do so by giving workers a vote on the nature of their employment. So, ironically, you apparently think the remedy against some types of private coercion is almost irrelevant too.

Again, if my neighbors kidnaps me and makes me his slave, society's norms deem this unacceptable and will back me up if I try to fight back, or people will try and come to

Quoting hamandcheese: Your mugger analogy is seriously flawed. Trying defending yourself against mobsters and oligopolies, or price gauging of inelastic services, or "pre-existing conditions", or debt collectors and drug lords. Its not quite as easy.

I didn't deny the existence of private plunder. So you bringing up examples of it is curious. I'm sure you can think of govt monopolies that are just as hard to defend against. My point stands: you have more options if the mugger is a private entity, than if it's the govt with the law on its side.

The history of the unionist movements around the world are, in the eyes of the members, attempts to resist the muggers. And they do so by giving workers a vote on the nature of their employment. So, ironically, you apparently think the remedy against some types of private coercion is almost irrelevant too.

Again, this is a strange example. I'm sure you've heard of violence that unions themselves perpetrate on workers that try to break a strike, haven't you? Unions are cartels of workers that try fend-off competition from would-be workers. They work best when they represent a small work-force with a lot of

Seems there's been a number of people replying since I last took a look. jimM47: Before replying to you, I will point something out, with the intent to avoid confusion (and to make the conversation more productive). (I've noticed that often when people have discussions, they are actually not arguing the same thing, but do not realize it. So let me say the following, to try to lower the probably of that situation happening here.) Based on your reply, what you have described as libertarianism is different from my (personal) "flavor" of libertarianism and different from what I'm most familiar with what others I know (on a face-to-face basis) that describe as libertarianism. Which isn't to say I'm "right" and you are "wrong". And is not to say that the "flavor" of libertarianism I'm most familiar with is representative. (And isn't to even say that I'm not familiar with what you have described as libertarianism.) But only to point out that there are differences among people who self-identify as libertarian. Years ago, there was a time, when I spent what seemed like more time than before, trying to resolve what I perceived to be logical inconsistencies in my moral

CONTINUED FORM THE PREVIOUS POST BECAUSE OF THE 10,000 CHARACTER LIMIT PER POST. NOTE THAT I ONLY RESPOND TO NOTIONS OF LIBERTARIANISM IN THIS POST. AND REPLY TO THE PARTS ABOUT SAM'S ARGUMENT IN A FOLLOWING POST. jimM47: Note that I'm largely replying from the point of view of my "flavor" of libertarianism. And not (in general) trying to do a broad coverage of what people who self-identify as libertarian think.

Quoting jimM47: That distinction — between coercion that is or is not backed by the threat of physical force — is actually more difficult to flesh out than it appears to be at first blush, and it makes the pursuit more pragmatic than some care to admit.

First, most coercion is physical coercion only in an attenuated sense. If I get a speeding ticket, the physical coercion forcing me to pay it exists only at the end of a long causal chain. I have to refuse to contest the ticket, refuse to pay it, refuse to pay it again, get arrested, and resist arrest or incarceration before I am gonna get anyone punching me in the face. When we count that as being physical coercion we need to remember to follow the same chain for everything.

I can't speak for others, but I would never call this physical coercion. But would instead call this the threat of physical coercion. (I.e., it's the punch in the face

Quoting jimM47: As I think I say in diavlog, "coercion" — as it is used in libertarian discourse — is a term of art. Some privately-emergent economic realities can be more constraining on freedom that some laws backed by a state monopoly on the use of force are. So when we call something coercive, in the libertarian sense, we are talking about the kind of coercion, not the magnitude of it.

Agreed.

Quoting jimM47: As I understood his argument, Sam isn't denying that this is the distinction Libertarians make, he is trying to present his argument for why it is not a valid distinction: why one should look to the magnitude of coercion, not it's source.

What does Sam mean by "valid"? Morally valid? (If so, that would depend on your moral framework, would it not?)

Quoting jimM47: I think it is an argument worth hearing over, because in fact many libertarian thinkers do acknowledge and worry about forms of coercion that are of a high magnitude but which do not originate in the state. Oppressive cultural norms are one example of this (though often they come up in the context of government action fostering bad cultural norms).

I'm not the type of libertarian

hamandcheese: I'm replying from my own point of view and moral framework. (And not trying to do an overview of all people who self-identify as libertarian.) Please interpret my replies below as such.

Quoting hamandcheese: I fully endorse and agree with Jim's post, the one that begins with "That distinction".

If you ignore the causal chain then the state is only ever coercive on the margins

Agreed.

Quoting hamandcheese: -- on those civil disobedients and criminals who defy the law. The other 99 out of a 100 people pay their taxes and smoke their weed in private, only occasionally feeling as if they're being "forced" to do anything, it's in our human nature to simply go with the flow.

My arguments were addressed specifically to the crowd who think the only legitimate way to organize society is in a way altogether voluntary -- not those libertarians who simply say "well, a smaller government just works better."

I would be of the former type.

Quoting hamandcheese: And I did so by trying to point out that their constant focus on government interventions ignores the huge anti-libertarian forces of, say, cultural homophobia.

Ireland has blasphemy laws, for example, that any good libertarian should be opposed to.

And

Quoting hamandcheese: Actually I would argue that even comparatively repressive regimes are only coercive by a casual chain. That is, their populations self-regulate and self-censor because of fear with very little direct coercion exerted on them.

In this sense even state coercion is, for the majority, a type of social or cultural coercion. Bare in mind that I'm not using this to justify state coercion, but to scold the libertarians who fall for the idea that only direct coercion counts. Pulling in the chain is a must.

(Assuming by "direct coercion" you mean ""physical coercion"....) From my point of view, direct coercion isn't the only form of coercion that matters. But it is the only form of coercion that is a moral issue. (I.e., other forms of coercion are outside the realm of morality. And it is not legitimate to "deal with them" in immoral ways.)

Quoting wreaver: (Assuming by "direct coercion" you mean ""physical coercion"....) From my point of view, direct coercion isn't the only form of coercion that matters. But it is the only form of coercion that is a moral issue. (I.e., other forms of coercion are outside the realm of morality. And it is not legitimate to "deal with them" in immoral ways.)

Exactly. If you believe that only direct coercion is immoral than you have fallen for the trap my and Jim's posts have both warned you about. Based on the above quote, and the one where you reject social coercion as morally relevant, you should be able to be a statist and be morally consistent by your own standards. This is the whole point of my argument. You must yank in the chain of causality for it to make sense, and in doing so to remain consistent, one must start including non-state phenomena too.

In the situation you have described, "negative liberty" has in fact been increased.

How? If you already agree that most state 'coercion' is indirect, threat based, or the population simply self-regulates, conforming to the law, than why are anti-blasphemy laws bad, but cultural witch hunts aren't?

What

There are indeed many flavors of libertarianism. Broadly speaking, though, these variations can be represented by two archetypes, which I think you describe well when you use the words: "axiomatic" and "consequentialist." No person is a pure version of one of these archetypes, of course, but I would generally describe myself as holding the 'consequentialist' position: what I care about is human welfare, defined in reference to the preferences of each individual. So I am looking for systems of rules, which, when implemented in the real world, are reletively stable and will lead to the greatest amounts of freedom. What you've said so far could be generally described as an 'axiomatic' position: you care about constructing a rational and self-consistent position. I think it emerges in the conversation between Sam and myself that most of his criticisms are directed more toward an axiomatic position, and that when he issued his initial diavlog challenge, a position like yours is what he was looking to debate. Since you appear to be such a person, perhaps you two should do a follow-up diavlog. I don't at all mean to demean the contributions of libertarians who disagree with me, but: For my own part, I am highly skeptical in

(And the point-by-point analysis)

Quoting wreaver: t's the punch in the face that's the physical coercion. The parts before it are the threat of physical coercion.... For me, this is an important distinction.

I am not sure I take your point as to this distinction. Coercion is by its nature a threat — a threat to make a threat of violence is just a type of threat of violence. Your distinction seems to imply that if a state achieves its ends by threatening force, and it must occasionally make good on that threat, the state is illegitimate; but that if the state threatens force so great or so persuasively that it never has to use that force, the state is legitimate. I make no such distinction.

Quoting wreaver: I've found that for those who seek logical consistency, concepts of property need either come in the form of an additional axiom (or axioms) or a system built on top of the existing axiom(s).

In my experience it isn't really possible to build a concept of property merely from contractarian axioms. What is required is an additional axiom, which not only supplements the requirement of voluntariness, but actual precedes

Quoting jimM47: I don't at all mean to demean the contributions of libertarians who disagree with me, but: For my own part, I am highly skeptical in general of the idea that it is within the capability of humans to rationally construct rules of society. (see Hayek's attacks on 'scientism')

I didn't think that's what I was doing. (Assuming that's what you were implying.) A logically consistent moral framework does not make anyone do or not do anything. It is just a perspective. It is a way of "calculating" whether something is immoral or not immoral. You could ask... what's the point of having this perspective if I don't expect people to "follow" it?! And I would say, I actually don't expect most people to. Given my current understanding of genetics and psychology, I think most of the time, with most of the population, you are not going to get this kind of behavior. (I suspect libertarianism and logically consistency tends to only appeal to a certain portion on the population.) But that's not the point. The point is that, if I am to even accept a notion of morality (as opposed to being amoral), then it needs to be logically consistent. The point is that, my moral framework

A couple of clarifications...

Quoting wreaver: I didn't think that's what I was doing. (Assuming that's what you were implying.)

A logically consistent moral framework does not make anyone do or not do anything. It is just a perspective. It is a way of "calculating" whether something is immoral or not immoral.

You could ask... what's the point of having this perspective if I don't expect people to "follow" it?! And I would say, I actually don't expect most people to. Given my current understanding of genetics and psychology, I think most of the time, with most of the population, you are not going to get this kind of behavior. (I suspect libertarianism and logically consistency tends to only appeal to a certain portion on the population.) But that's not the point. The point is that, if I am to even accept a notion of morality (as opposed to being amoral), then it needs to be logically consistent. The point is that, my moral framework will affect my actions. (And that includes when I choose to "punch someone in the face", and not just what I refrain from doing.) And will affect who I choose to associate with.

Even if I were to hope people would not commit immoral acts (under my

Quoting jimM47:

Quoting wreaver: t's the punch in the face that's the physical coercion. The parts before it are the threat of physical coercion.... For me, this is an important distinction.

I am not sure I take your point as to this distinction. Coercion is by its nature a threat — a threat to make a threat of violence is just a type of threat of violence. Your distinction seems to imply that if a state achieves its ends by threatening force, and it must occasionally make good on that threat, the state is illegitimate; but that if the state threatens force so great or so persuasively that it never has to use that force, the state is legitimate. I make no such distinction.

You are correct. Under my moral framework, with your later case, no individual in that group would have done anything immoral (as part of their stately actions).

I don't see this as a problem. So if you believe this to be an important point, please elaborate.

Quoting jimM47:

Quoting wreaver: I've found that for those who seek logical consistency, concepts of property need either come in the form of an additional axiom (or axioms) or a system built on top

Lest we forget 1964...

To answer the question posed in the topic, the philosophical merits of libertarianism are exiguous. From an Augustinian point of view, I suppose that it is better that one can know the good and do its opposite, contrary to the Socratic point of view. And there, in a nutshell, lies any philosophical merit that libertarianism might possess. Libertarianism is for nutcases.

I would like to hear comments on how the Fair Tax proposal would affect all of this.
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